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Abstract 
 
Sovereign wealth funds have recently moved to the front and center of discussion, both within 
the investment world and the political arena. In this paper we evaluate the differences and 
common features of these funds. Utilizing an ownership database, we probe the ownership, 
geographic, and industry concentration of the funds deployed by these entities. We also compare 
and contrast the main features of two of the largest sovereign wealth funds. 
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Sovereign Wealth Funds: An Exploratory Study of Their Behavior 
 
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have been around for decades. Recently, however, and mainly 
during the third millennium, they have moved to the front and center of discussion within the 
investment world and the political arena. Two principal reasons may be offered for such 
attention: The first is rooted in the upward movement of commodity prices, particularly the 
steady increase in oil prices that began in 2002. This so-called “windfall” created an 
unprecedented level of funding sources for these funds, which in turn led to a steady and robust 
rate of growth in assets under management of these funds. As a result, they now play a 
significant role in the global financial markets.
1
 The second reason is rooted in the nature of 
these funds. By definition, these funds are owned by the governments, rather than the private 
sectors of their respective countries. As a result, a great deal of rhetoric has been aired over their 
motives, and their objectives have been much more closely scrutinized, and often with suspicion. 
The suspicion that SWFs may serve the political objectives of their respective governments has 
grown with the growth of these funds, and sometimes disproportionately so. These suspicions are 
often reinforced by the fact that it is very difficult to obtain reliable information about most 
SWFs investments.
2
  
Leaving the investment world aside for now, the political concerns have, for the most part, been 
expressed by those who fear that through such investments, “non-democratic” countries may 
take control of their vital companies and jeopardize their security. In the US alone, there have 
been several congressional hearings on this issue. Additionally, statements made by appointed 
and elected officials often lay bare such concerns. For example, in response to the news of 
possible contract for Dubai Port World to manage six US ports, Hilary Clinton (then a Senator 
representing the State of New York) stated that “In a post 9/11 world, port security is too an 
important issue to be treated so cavalierly.” In November 2009, Marisa Lago, President Obama’s 
Choice for the Treasury Department’s Assistant Secretary for international markets and 
developments stated that “… sovereign wealth funds are not just a private sector investor, but 
rather arms of government and need to be subject to stricter scrutiny than other foreign investors 
invested in U.S. assets.”     
However, apparently all politicians do not share such concerns. Many have expressed their 
positions in a manner indicating that allowing SWFs to invest in firms within their jurisdictions 
is in line with the spirit of “globalization” and that of “open economies,” and that such 
investments have the potential to fill the gap in the capital market created by insufficient savings 
rates in these countries.  Furthermore, it can be argued that the business world is, in general, 
supportive of the notion of providing SWFs easy access to equity markets. For example, Pete 
Peterson, co-founder and senior chairman of the Blackstone Group has indicated that he does not 
believe that SWFs’ investment strategies are driven by a desire to control.  Rather, he has said he 
believes, they are driven by financially attractive payoffs.  In an interview with Charlie Rose on 
April 3, 2008, he stated that “people who are a bit paranoid about the sovereign funds, I don’t 
know if they have thought through what the alternative is.”  He then went on to inquire as to 
whether it would be better if SWFs kept all their funds in hard currencies, which could run 
around the world and cause a huge problem with the dollar, or if it would be better if they were 
allowed to invest their funds for the long term.   
                                                             
1 Collectively, these funds had $3,938 million asset under management in September 2010 (see Appendix 1). 
2 Only one fund (Norway Government Pension Fund) amongst the top ten funds has a perfect score of 10 on the 
transparency issue (see appendix 1). 
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Indeed, if these funds do not follow a buy-and-hold strategy, the magnitude of their trades has 
the potential to increase the volatility of markets. As such, they can be considered a destabilizing 
force and, therefore, deserving of close supervision and regulation. On the other hand, if their 
behavior is dictated by disciplined long-term investment strategies, they can be net contributors 
to the stability of markets, and could help reduce market volatility. The latter is advocated by 
Pimco’s Mohammad El-Erian: “Patient nature of their large capital pools and the long-term 
nature of their objective functions are the best set of investment characteristics for virtually all 
global investors.” (El-Erian, 2010). 
The former scenario, and its attendant implications, have often been forwarded (and more 
vigorously so) when SWFs have been observed to increase their equity investment and their 
influence in the corporate governance of the companies involved. In response, lawmakers in the 
countries involved have called for new regulations and higher transparency. In a few cases there 
have even been calls for quantitative disclosure of the investment strategies, outcomes, nature, 
and the location of actual investments (Truman, 2007).
3
  
Given these arguments, one would expect a bountiful supply of academic research on the topic. 
However, with a few exceptions, the issue has not been adequately dealt with. Interestingly, 
some of the writings that do exist also incorporate and refer to the dialogue in the political arena. 
For example, Gilson and Milhuapt (2008), state that “...the principal concern with SWF equity 
investments is that they may have a significant strategic element driven by self-interest. The fear 
is that SWFs will use their influence on portfolio companies to secure technology (a concern 
raised explicitly in the discussion of the Abu Dhabi fund’s investment in AMD), gain access to 
natural resources, improve competitive positions for domestic companies, or in a fashion that has 
national security concerns for the portfolio company’s country of incorporation.” As a potential 
solution to this problem, Gilson and Milhuapt propose that the voting rights of SWF entities be 
suspended, although they also recognize that the “influence can be exercised by means other than 
voting; “a significant shareholder need not always cast a vote to sway management.” 
Baron, Papaioannou, and Petrova (2010) analyze the investment strategy of commodity-based 
SWFs and link them to the macroeconomic variables of their home countries. However, their 
analysis is more normative than positive. They argue that in order for SWFs to “perform well in 
most states of the world,” they should consider using the mean-variance Markowitz type model 
as a good start and complement it with an appropriate method for risk management. To this end, 
they emphasize investments that are negatively correlated with the SWF country’s economic 
growth. For example, for oil-based SWFs and particularly the oil producing countries with 
“narrow economic bases”, they recommend a bias towards US assets.  
This objective-based strategic asset allocation is also in line with the work of Xiang, Wang, 
Kong, and Li (2009), who propose four different strategic asset allocations based on the 
characteristics of the underlying economies of the respective countries. Therefore, given that the 
oil-based countries are vulnerable to global economic conditions, a heavy investment in long-
                                                             
3  However, it should be noted that in most cases, these funds do not attempt to take control of the 
companies they invested in. For example, when in December 2009 the Chicago-based Hyatt Hotels, disclosed 
that Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) has bought 4.8 million (10.9%) of Hyatt’s Class A common shares, 
it was also announced that ADIA intends to remain minority shareholder. 
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term bonds is proscribed. For net importers of oil and primary commodities, on the other hand, 
investing in industries that are linked to these commodities is more appropriate.  Countries with a 
long-term horizon should invest in stocks and other long term assets, and those seeking long-
term real returns need to invest in TIPS products. The authors further argue that SWFs’ 
investment, and asset mamagement strategies, are more systematic and goal-dependent than 
many other institutions. In support of their argument they report finding that with shorter-horizon 
funds invest in short-term and low risk portfolios, while other SWFs adopt longer term, higher 
risk, investment strategies. Funds with defined liability, in contrast, focus their strategy on asset-
liability matching and balance-sheet risk management.   
Bernstein, Lerner, and Schoar (2009) investigate SWFs’ direct investments in private equity and 
report several interesting patterns. Consistent with the results reported by Chhochharia and 
Laeven (2009), they find evidence in support of the presence of a home bias. However, they also 
report that there is a greater likelihood of home bias where politicians are involved in the 
management of funds compared to where external managers are the decision makers. 
Additionally, funds managed by politicians tend to invest in high P/E ratio industries, which 
experience a negative valuation change one year after their investments. Independent 
professional managers, on the other hand, tend to invest in low P/E ratio assets that experience a 
positive value change a year later. They conclude that, overall, “SWFs seem to engage in a form 
of trend chasing” investment activity. Further, “they are more likely to invest at home when 
domestic equity prices are higher, and invest abroad when foreign prices are higher.” 
None of these studies are, however, conclusive in providing us a picture of the behavioral and 
political motives of the SWFs. This study is designed to shed light on the investment behavior of 
these entities.  We attempt to disentangle facts from fiction, and examine the industry, with an 
in-depth analysis of two of these funds.  
 
Characteristics and Types 
 
Arguably, the most commonly accepted definition of SWF, is the one adopted by the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute: ”state owned investment fund composed of financial assets such as 
stocks, bonds, real estate or other financial instruments funded by foreign exchange assets” 
(SWF Institute, 2011). As of early 2011, these funds had over $4.1 trillion in assets under 
management, with the ten largest, SWFs holding 79% of total assets. (See Figure 1.) Virtually, 
all analysts expect these funds and their influence to grow. However, the rate of their asset 
growth is subject of some disagreement. Some estimates suggest that assets under their 
management will reach the $12-15 trillion range by 2015
4
. However, Baldwin (2008) maintains 
that because of a lack of sufficient information these figures are exaggerated.  
All sovereign wealth funds share the state ownership feature. However, when it comes to many 
other characteristics, they are anything but homogenous. Among others, these include the nature 
of operations, objectives, investment horizon, risk-return profile, asset allocation, and risk 
tolerance. Their heterogeneity, therefore, makes it difficult to lump them all into one category. 
Nonetheless, good insight can be had if one starts with gaining an understanding of the purpose 
for which the fund was set up. As Rozanov (2007) points out, when the required cash outlays and 
their timing is known with a good degree of certainty, as it is in the case for traditional funds 
(pension funds, endowment funds, etc.), the process of optimizing funding policies, asset 
allocation, and risk management follow in a natural progression; all subject to the constraints 
                                                             
4 Morgan Stanley Global Research (2007). 
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imposed by the nature of their funds or their governing bodies. Therefore the sequence of events 
is as follows:  
 
 
 
 
However, when it comes to sovereign wealth funds the process is often not the same. For 
example, commodity exporting economies may experience unexpected windfall revenues from a 
positive terms-of-trade shock. This often results in a redesigning of the structure of assets to 
adjust to the new source of funding. In such cases, the previously identified sequence of events 
reverses order, with a subsequent ‘normalization’ of the process at the end. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following this process, and starting with the nature of liabilities, SWFs can be divided into the 
five categories of funds: (1) Stabilization/Buffer, (2) Endowment, (3) Pension Reserve, (4) 
Development, and (5) Government Holdings Management. In a slightly different fashion, 
Mehrpouya, Huang, & Barnett (2009) divide SWFs into the following six categories: 
 
  Types of SWFs Type 
of SWF 
Objective Attributes Examples 
Stabilization Funds  Aim to insulate the budget 
and the economy against 
commodity (usually oil) 
price swings and crises  
Short- to mid-term 
investment time horizon  
Russian Reserve Fund  
Intergenerational Wealth 
Transfer Funds  
Aim to convert 
nonrenewable assets into a 
more diversified portfolio of 
assets  
Long term  KIA; GPFG (Government 
Pension Fund Global)  
Reserve Investment 
Corporations  
Assets are often still 
counted as reserve assets, 
and are established to 
increase the return on 
reserves  
Long term – more 
aggressive return 
requirements  
China Investment 
Corporation (CIC); 
Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation 
(GIC)  
Development Funds  Help fund socioeconomic 
projects or promote 
industrial policies that might 
raise a country's potential 
output growth  
Socially focused – less 
focus on returns  
Nordic Development Fund; 
European Development 
Fund  
Contingent Pension Reserve 
Funds  
Provide (from sources other 
than individual pension 
contributions) for contingent 
unspecified pension 
liabilities on the 
government's balance sheet  
Mostly long term; risk 
appetite and investment 
time horizon dependent on 
the trends and timeline of 
the pension liabilities  
Australian Government 
Future Fund (AGFF)  
Government Asset Manager  Primarily manage formerly 
government-owned 
companies on behalf of the 
government  
Long-term strategic investor 
– large stakes  
Temasek Holdings 
(Temasek)  
 
Define 
Liabilities 
Design and 
set up funds 
Accumulate 
and manage 
assets 
Define 
Liabilities 
Redesign and 
restructure  funds 
Accumulate 
assets 
Design and 
set up funds 
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However, neither systems is capable of correctly classifying all funds. For example the Norway 
Pension Fund would have elements of both “pension reserves” and “intergenerational wealth 
transfer”. Regardless of these differences, SWFs have important common characteristics:  
1. Typically, they are established to invest government funds. 
2. With the exception of stabilization funds they have long-term investment horizon.  
3. They all have increased their equity investment, which has also increased their influence 
in corporate governance of the companies involved.   
 
To deal with concerns over the political motives of SWFs, the International Working Group 
of Sovereign Wealth Funds has created the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices – 
Santiago Principles (IWG, 2008). These principles can be regarded as a framework, 
providing SWFs guidance for appropriate governance and accountability agreements, and for 
the implementation of appropriate investment practices. These principles, in essence, were 
developed to foster trust and confidence that SWFs act and behave like other investment 
funds. That is, they are driven by the motive to maximize the return on invested capital, and 
that their investments are devoid of political agenda. 
 
Further, in an apparent attempt to nudge its member funds toward higher degrees of 
transparency, the SWF Institute has been utilizing the Principles of the Linaburg-Maduell 
Transparency Index to measure and report member funds’ efforts on that front (SWF 
Institute, 2010). This index is based on ten indicators of transparency, each assuming a 
binary value. Measured in this manner, the SWF Institute classifies a fund as “transparent” if 
it achieves a minimum rating of eight points. Table 1 shows the ten rating principles. 
 
Investment Strategies 
 
When it comes to an evaluation of the investment strategies employed, SWFs are as a 
heterogeneous of a group as any other, with the type of fund as the best predictor of their 
strategy. Nonetheless, it can be safely generalized that most SWFs have long-term 
investment horizons and attempt to achieve long-term stable revenues from their investments 
in capital markets (Xiang, Wang, Kong, & Li, 2009).  
 
Asset Allocation: 
SWFs’ asset allocation models vary from the very traditional to the more advanced cathegory 
(IMF, 2008). A few invest only in highly rated government securities, but most invest in 
several different asset classes. The majority of SWFs invests in a mix of equity and fixed 
income assets, while many also invest in private equity, real estate and alternative 
investments. According to a 2008 IMF survey, all SWFs make investments in fixed income 
assets, 60 % in public equities, 40 % in private equity and real estate, and only about 20 % in 
commodities (see Figure 2). 
Results of the same IMF survey indicate that a typical fund now invests 40–70% of its funds 
in equity, 4–10% in private equity funds, 13–40% in fixed income, 2–5% in infrastructure, 2–
5%in commodities, and 8–10% in real estate. Therefore, it can be concluded that over time: 
(1) SWFs have moved away from the US Government long-term bonds, (2) have increased 
their allocation to equity investments, (3) have increased diversification by moving into 
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alternative investments, (4) have migrated from a purely passive management style to a more 
active and dynamic one. 
 
Sector Allocation: 
SWFs invest in a broad range of industries. However, financial services and real estate are 
usually overweighed. Their investments in the finance sector are, however, not limited to 
banks. They also invest in alternative assets such as hedge funds, asset management 
companies, private equity investment firms and the operators of stock exchanges (Xiang, 
Wang, Kong, & Li, 2009). Further, all indicators are that, following the 2008 global financial 
crisis, many of these funds have increased their exposure to the financial services sector. In 
some cases, they have played a role as the rescuer of last resort. SWFs have also increased 
their investments in strategic sectors such as energy companies, the operators of ports, and 
financial exchanges in America and Europe, stirring a debate about their political objectives. 
Motivated partly to avoid being forced to discuss their objectives, some of these funds have 
self-imposed limitations on their sector allocation. The Chinese Investment Corporation 
(CIC), for example, has indicated it does not plan to invest in sensitive industries such as 
airlines, telecom, tobacco or weapons by any manufacturers.  
 
Geographic Allocation: 
As a general rule, sovereign wealth funds have a heavy home and regional bias in their 
investments. Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) find that SWFs “tend to invest in countries 
with common cultural traits.” They argue that this bias is driven by a pre-disposition by all 
investors to invest in the “familiar”. However, they hypothesize that the cultural bias of 
SWFs is more pronounced than that of other funds. Bernstein, Lerner, and Schoar, (2009) 
report findings in support of the presence of the home bias. They further report that there is a 
greater likelihood of home bias when politicians manage these funds. 
Two other explanations for this observed home bias have also been offered. One is based on 
the diversification principle and the other on information arguments. The former posits that a 
nation with a narrow base of economic activities (e.g., an oil-based economy) can, and 
should, diversify its economic base by investing in unrelated businesses that broaden its local 
economic base. Abu Dhabi’s investments in the financial services industry are often offered 
as a good example of such an approach (e.g. see Balding 2008). 
The latter reason is based on the difficulty and the cost of investing beyond the country’s (or 
region’s) borders. Advances in technology have significantly reduced the barriers to the free 
flow of capital between nations. Nonetheless, the “asymmetry of information between local 
and non-local investors”, the differential information acquisition costs, and the incremental 
political and foreign currency conversion costs, create a net advantage for domestic 
investments relative to the international ones. In this spirit Coval and Moskowitz (1999) 
attribute the home (and region) bias more to the geographic distance than to the political 
boundary. Disadvantaged in terms of access to information, and the ability to recruit talented 
managers and employees, SWFs shy away from the international setting in favor of home 
investments. Both explanations are useful in describing the reasons for a greater likelihood of 
home bias when politician manage these funds. 
Whatever the motives, the home and regional biases are ever present. Contemporary 
examples include the August 2010 attempt by the Malaysian government to call on the 
member countries of the Islamic Development Bank to establish “the world’s first supra-
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sovereign wealth fund” for the purpose of investing in Muslim economies, as well as the 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s similar call (following the 2008 global financial crisis) to 
the European countries to set up a European Sovereign Wealth Fund to invest in capital-
hungry European firms.  
 
Ownership: 
Although most SWFs do not hold majority stake in individual companies, they often do 
exercise their voting power. The Norwegian Pension Fund, for example, uses its voting rights 
in more than 90% of the occasions that call for stockholders’ vote. In terms of concentration 
of holdings, 70% of the SWFs included in the IMF survey confirm that they have large 
holdings of particular firms, often along with their other portfolio holdings. Only two of the 
SWFs state that they are pure portfolio investors. These funds often use their voting power to 
have some control over the governance of the companies they own.  
 
Management: 
Due to lack of in-house capacity to invest in certain asset classes (Mehrpouya, Huang, & 
Barnett, 2009), most SWFs do not have in house managers and use external managers for 
their investments. Thus, the SWFs rely on external fund managers to implement their 
strategic asset allocation in areas where their capacity is limited. Another reason to use 
external managers is to avoid the potential discussion of the investment and how the SWFs 
execute their voting rights (Xiang, Wang, Kong, & Li, 2009). As funds grow, their tendency 
for having in-house managers grows as well. For example, the Norwegian Fund now 
manages about 83% of its assets.  
 
Analysis 
 
In this section we analyze the investment behavior of SWFs through an evaluation of their 
investment activities, as reported by the companies in which they have made investments.  
To this end, we utilize the OSIRIS ownership database.  This database identifies the investors 
in all publicly traded firms, within a jurisdiction, who hold more than a certain percentage of 
shares in those firms
5
.  Relying on the International Security Identification Number (ISIN), to 
determine the home country for each company, we evaluate the ownership data of public 
companies in 46 countries searching for sovereign wealth funds as owners
6
. Altogether, the 
search for owners of public companies in these 46 countries resulted in the identification of 
15 sovereign funds with ownership in publicly traded companies surpassing the minimum 
reporting requirements.  
                                                             
5 The minimum percentage ownership beyond which firms have to identify the owner is usually low, but varies for 
different countries.  The lowest minimum is 2% in Italy and the highest minimum is 25% in Russia.  See Schouten 
and Siems (2010) for a listing of the thresholds in various countries.   
6 The 46 countries included consist of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. 
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It should be noted that the, so obtained, ownership reports add up to just a portion of the total 
assets under control of each fund, and that in some cases this portion is very small (see Table 
2).  The missing portion is comprised of three components.  First, investments in privately 
held corporations that are not subject to ownership disclosure requirements.  Second, 
investments in publicly traded firms that are below the threshold triggering disclosure 
reports. Finally, the funds’ domestic and regional investments in countries not covered in our 
database, or those that do impose ownership disclosure requirements.  
 
In order to determine if these funds follow a strategy of concentrating their investments in 
certain industries, we calculated each fund’s Herfindahl Concentration Index. The results are 
reported in Table 3.  Results for 2009 indicate the presence of high concentration of 
investments in certain industries by a few funds; while UAE’s RAK Investment Authority 
invests exclusively in diversified metal and mining firms, China Investment Corporation and 
Investment Corporation of Dubai invest almost all their funds in banks and financial services 
firms.  We note, however, that although these results are influenced by the absence of data 
for other investments, they are indicative of a presence of heavy concentrations where data is 
available.  Nonetheless, given that these concentrations are calculated based on small 
fractions of total assets invested, the resulting indexes tend to overestimate their true 
underlying values.  Therefore, we suspect that had it been possible to obtain the entire data 
for each fund, the resulting concentration indexes would have assumed smaller values.  It is 
also worthwhile to note that, for the four funds with data availability for 2005 and 2007 (Abu 
Dhabi Investment Authority, Government of Singapore, Kuwait Investment Authority, and 
Temasek Holdings), concentration ratios show a pattern of steady decreases over time.  
 
We next examine the geographic concentration of these funds by calculating Herfindahl 
Index for the geographic distribution of their asset allocation. As shown in Table 4, the data 
indicates the presence of high geographic concentrations in a few funds: UAE’s RAK 
Investment Authority has an exclusive concentration of investments in Australia, as does the 
Australia Future Fund; Sovereign Fund of Brazil and Alberta Heritage Fund have an 
exclusive concentration in their respective countries of Brazil and Canada; and the 
Investment Corporation of Dubai has an almost exclusive concentration of its investments in 
the US.  We note that while concentration indexes are driven by the regional and domestic 
preferences of these funds, the fact that we only work with a small fraction of these funds’ 
investments creates an upward bias in these calculated indexes.  Here, again, had it been 
possible to obtain the entirety of ownership data for these funds, lower concentration indexes 
would have been observed.  Further, for the three funds with data availability for 2005 and 
2007 (Government of Singapore, Kuwait Investment Authority, and Temasek Holdings), 
geographic concentration ratios show a pattern of steady decreases over time.    
 
Given the more stringent disclosure requirements that prevail among the G8, it may be 
instructive to further evaluate the industry and geographic concentration of SWFs that 
operate within the jurisdictions of theses countries.  Calculations of Herfindahl Concentration 
Index for industry and geographic concentrations (among the G8 countries) are reported in 
Tables 5 and 6, respectively.  As can be seen in Table 5, only 11 of the 15 funds were found 
in the ownership database of the G8 countries.  Here, again, we find high concentrations in 
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certain industries with Alberta Heritage Fund investing exclusively in agricultural products 
and the Abu Dhabi Investment Fund investing exclusively in specialized finance.  As we did 
in explaining the results for the entire sample in Table 3, we hypothesize that the high 
concentration indexes are partly attributable to the lack of the availability of all investment 
data for these funds.  (Availability of data on investments in privately held corporations that 
are not subject to ownership disclosure requirements; investments in publicly traded firms 
that are below the threshold triggering disclosure reports; and the funds’ domestic and 
regional investments in countries not covered in our database, or those that do impose 
ownership disclosure requirements would have resulted in lower estimates of these indexes.)  
We further note that for the four funds with data availability for 2005 and 2007 (Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority, Government of Singapore, Kuwait Investment Authority, and 
Temasek Holdings), concentration ratios show steadily decreasing patterns over time.  Table 
6, shows the geographic distribution of ownership of these funds among G8 countries.  These 
results indicate the presence of high geographic concentrations of a few funds: Investment 
Corporation of Dubai has an exclusive concentration of investments in the US, while Alberta 
Heritage Fund has its concentrated in Canada.  Kuwait Investment Authority, and Temasek 
Holdings have more than 80% concentration in the U.K., and France’s Strategic Investment 
Fund more than 80% inside that country.  Here, too, it should be noted that while 
concentration indexes are driven by the regional and domestic preferences of these funds, the 
fact that we only work with a small fraction of these funds’ investments tends to create an 
upward bias in these calculated indexes.  Finally, note that for the three funds with data 
availability for 2005 and 2007 (Government of Singapore, Kuwait Investment Authority, and 
Temasek Holdings), geographic concentration ratios show a pattern of steady decreases over 
time.    
 
An Examination of Two Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
Temasek Holdings:  The fund dates back to 1974 when it was established in order to 
manage Singapore government’s investments in local industry. The fund’s charge was later 
expanded to include holdings in the global markets as well.  To finance its new investments, 
the fund relies upon dividends received from existing investments, proceeds from 
divestments, and commercial loans (Temasek Holdings, 2009).   The fund operates as an 
independent investment holding company, with the Ministry of Finance as the sole 
shareholder.  Although it operates as an arm of the Government of Singapore, it has its own 
independent board of directors.  
Investment Strategy: The fund invests primarily in equity market and has a strong regional 
and country bias.  As of March 31, 2010, the fund had 78 % of its investments in Asia (up 
from 74% in 2009) with a main focus on Singapore (32% in 2010, up from 31% in 2009). 
The remaining 22 % is invested in OECD economies (20%) and other parts of the world 
(2%) such as Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa (see Table 7, Panel 
A).  Temasek Holdings defines its investment strategy as centered around four themes 
Transforming Economies, Growing Middle Class, Deepening Comparative Advantages, and 
Emerging Champions (Temasek Holding, 2010).  This gives rise to a strategy of investing in 
companies and industries that are believed to be able to sustain economic growth because 
their growths are positively correlated with one or more of these four themes. The fund 
believes that this strategy will result in obtaining higher long-term risk-adjusted returns.  
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Asset Allocation: A broad range of industries make up Temasek’s portfolio with the financial 
services sector claiming the lion’s share.  As of March 31, 2010, 37% of its $186 billion 
investment was allocated to this sector (up from 33% in 2009).  The other major components 
are telecommunication, media & technology (24%), transportation & industrials (18%), life 
sciences, consumer products & real estate (11%), energy & resources (6%), and other (4%). 
Its heavy emphasis on the financial services firms is rooted in Temasek’s management’s 
belief that the sector driven by continued strong demand for the financial services products 
by the Asian middle class population (see Table 7, Panel B) has the best potential for 
continued high growth. 
 
Ownership: Temasek appears to be fairly active in the corporate governance of the firms 
making up its portfolio, and possibly more so than other SWFs.  Its holdings consist of 
blocks of 20% or more in the equity of 43% of its listed investments (Table 7, Panel C). The 
fund appoints individuals to the boards of directors of these firms and utilizes its voting 
power. Therefore, in many ways Temasek seems different than the average SWF.  It is an 
active investor that attempts to make strategic purchases and become involved in the 
corporate governance of the companies it acquires.  At the same time Temasek shares some 
of the general features of all SWFs; it is a long-term investor, does not have any short-term 
liabilities, holds many different assets, its largest holdings are in the financial services 
sector.  
 
The Government Pension Fund Global:  This is the largest investment mandate of the 
Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) that manages the fund on behalf of the 
Norwegian Government.  It was set up in 1990 to undertake long-term management of the 
country’s petroleum revenue (NBIM, 2010). It is the second largest Sovereign Wealth Fund 
in the world, which holds more than 12% of all assets under management of SWFs.  (Prior 
to 2006, the fund’s official name was the “Petroleum Fund”.)  Although the fund was 
established as a fiscal policy tool for the government to deal with the fluctuation in the oil 
prices, it has been designed in a manner that makes it possible for the government to draw 
from it should it be determined that such withdrawals are required in order to deal with the 
needs of the country’s aging population.  Therefore, this fund can be categorized as an 
“intergenerational wealth transfer” fund.   
 
Investment Strategy:  The investment objective of the fund is to maximize return with 
moderate risk. The risk level is set by the Ministry of Finance (Caner and Grennes, 2008). 
Owing to the long-term nature of its liabilities, it has a much longer investment horizon 
when compared to the average household or institutional investor.  The fund has a high risk-
bearing capacity because there is no concrete commitment linked to the asset pool and no 
short-term liquidity requirements (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2009).  Further, the fund 
strives to hold a diversified portfolio consisting of investments in firms that follow specific 
ethical guidelines in the course of conducting their business.  As a result, over the course of 
the last few years, a number of large multinational firms, including Boeing, Rio Tinto and 
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Wal-Mart, have been removed from the portfolio because of various violations of the fund’s 
ethical guidelines.
7
  
 
Asset Allocation: As shown in Table 8, the current target asset allocation model of the fund 
calls for weights of 60% equity, 35% fixed income, and 5% real estate
8
. As of May 2010, its 
fixed income portfolio consisted of 60% investment in Europe, 35% in America and 5% in 
Asia and Oceania. The equity portfolio was made up of 50% investment in Europe, 35% in 
Americas and 15% in Asia and Oceania (Norwegian Ministry of Finance May 2010)
9
.  
Unlike Temasek, which routinely holds a minimum 20% stake in firms that it invests in, the 
Government Pension Fund used to restrict its investments in individual companies to less 
than 5% of the equity outstanding.  However, this limit was raised to 10% in 2008 
(Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2009).  The Fund’s benchmark portfolio consists of almost 
7,700 companies across 46 countries. Its benchmark index for bonds includes more than 
10,000 individual securities across some 1,600 issuers in the currencies of 21 different 
countries.  As a consequence of the low percentage stake held in each company, and the 
well-diversified portfolio that it holds (made up of a large number of different assets) its 
investment style can be best characterized as passive (or indexing).  Nevertheless, parts of 
the fund’s assets are also managed actively through investments in securities other than the 
ones in their respective benchmark portfolios
10
.   
 
Sector allocation: The fund is diversified across many sectors. However, like many other 
SWFs, the financial sector is overweighed by 23.1%. This is followed by industrials (12.6%), 
consumer goods (11.7%) and oil and gas (9.8%) sectors.  Table 8 shows these details.  
 
A Comparison of Temasek and the Government Investment Holding Company: 
Whereas Temasek was established to manage companies that were formerly owned by the 
Government of Singapore (i.e., designed to become a government investment holding 
company), the Norwegian Fund was originally established as a fiscal policy tool.  However, 
the latter’s orientation was subsequently altered to fit the purpose of transferring some of the 
wealth created by its petroleum revenue to the country’s future generations.  
When compared on the basis of investment strategy, Temasek’s can be best described as 
active, and the Norwegian Fund’s as passive (with an active element built in).   Further, 
whereas Temasek gets actively involved in the corporate governance of its invested firms, 
the Norwegian Fund shies away from such involvement.  However, the latter avoids (or 
divests of) those firms that are not governed well, as judged by a set of ethical guidelines.  
In terms of asset allocation, the Norwegian Fund is mainly invested in publicly traded equity 
and fixed income, with real estate as a recent addition to its benchmark’s classes of assets.  
                                                             
7
 For a comprehensive example of companies that are excluded see http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/norway-
government-pension-fund-global/ 
8
 Prior to 2007 the equity weight was limited to 40%.  Raising the upper limit for equity investments from 40% to 
60% and allocating up to 5 % of the fund’s capital to real estate (first real estate investments having been made in 
2010), were the two most important changes in the last few years. 
9 Caner & Grennes (2008) argue that the fund has become more exposed to risk over time, and refer to the losses 
caused by holdings of Lehman Brothers assets in 2008 as an evidence for this increased exposure.  Of course, part 
of the increase in risk is due to the lifting of the equity weight in the benchmark from 40% to 60%.  
10 However, the Ministry of Finance has established an upper limit of 1.5% tracking error. 
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Temasek’s investments, on the other hand, are almost entirely in equities, and a large portion 
of these investments is in privately held firms.   
The difference in these two funds’ desire to exercise their ownership rights may be best 
explained by the stakes they maintain in individual firms.  With more than 43% of its 
investments, Temasek holds an equity stake of more than 20% of the shares.  The 
Norwegian Fund, however, limits itself to less than 10%, and in most cases its investments 
do not approach that limit. Temasek, therefore, positions itself to control the companies by 
vigorously exercising its voting rights (see, for example, Mehrpouya, Huang, & Barnett, 
2009).  Although the Norwegian fund exercises its voting rights to safeguard its interest and 
to encourage ethical, social and environmental standards in corporate governance, its small 
minority stake limits its ability to do so effectively.   
Both funds have their largest investments in the financial services sector.  However, it 
appears that the Norwegian Fund keeps a more balanced holding between sectors than does 
Temasek.  Further, both funds have regional biases, and hold the majority of their 
investments in their respective local regions. The Norwegian Fund does not invest in 
Norway but keeps over 50% of its investments in Europe. Temasek, on the other hand, 
invests 78% of its capital in Asian assets. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that Temasek 
has a higher country (and regional risk) exposure than does the Norwegian Fund.  Finally, 
both of these funds have a long-term investment horizon. 
 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
In this study we analyze sovereign wealth funds through a close examination of their 
characteristics, practices, strategies and their other features.  To gain better insight into their 
strategy, we also examine their holdings through an evaluation of the information extracted 
from ownership disclosure requirements imposed on firms headquartered in 46 different 
countries. Further, we perform an in-depth analysis of two of these funds: Temasek and the 
Government Pension Fund of Norway, both enjoying the highest transparency index of 10. 
Depending on the nature of their liabilities, SWFs can be divided into five distinct groups. 
However, they all share a few important common characteristics: Their investment horizon 
is much closer to the long-term end of the spectrum, they have a higher than average degree 
of risk tolerance, and in their investment decisions are more geared toward stability as 
opposed to turnover. They all have reduced their portion of investments allocated to fixed 
income in favor of larger allocations to equities. Some have also added other asset classes 
such as real estate, private equity, and other alternative investments to their allocation 
models. Finally, they exhibit a tendency toward a more active investment style and more 
active involvement in corporate governance of firm they invest in. 
Our analysis of these funds’ holdings indicates the presence of heavy industry concentration 
for some of these funds. Although, the Herfindahl Index that this conclusion is based on may 
be upwardly biased, these funds’ tendency to heavily invest in the financial sector is well 
supported even through a casual observation. Interestingly, where data is available, we 
detect a clear pattern of reduction in these degrees of concentration. Further, our calculated 
Herfindahl index indicates the presence of heavy geographic concentration for some of these 
funds, which confirms the presence of a domestic and regional preference for some of these 
funds. Here, too, where date is available, we detect a clear pattern of declining concentration 
over time. When we limit our analysis to the investment holdings of SWFs in G8 countries, 
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we observe heavy, but declining, geographic concentration in the US and UK, as well as a 
heavy concentration in the financial services sectors.  
Sovereign wealth funds are not of the plain vanilla type that can be easily understood. Their 
opacity adds further complication to the process of a complete analysis. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that their investment motives are often subject of political controversy. If there are 
any, our analysis fails to uncover the presence of disruptive effects, which can be attributed 
to their investment behavior. To the contrary, it can be argued that the relatively long 
investment horizon of these funds, acts as a stabilizing force, and specially so at times of 
high market volatility. Nonetheless, these funds should take greater steps toward a high 
degree of transparency.   
77
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 15, Issue 2, Winter 2011 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Balding, C., 2008, “A portfolio Analysis of Sovereign Wealth Funds,” University of California, 
Irvine. 
 
Bernstein, S., J., Lerner, and A., Schoar, 2009, “The Investment Strategy of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds,” Harvard Business School Working Papar, 09-112. 
 
Bridis, T., 2006, 12. 2. Washington Post. Retrieved Nov. 21, 2009, from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/11/AR2006021101112.html 
 
Brown, A. M., Papaioanneou, and I., Petrova, 2010, “Macro financial Linkages of the Strategic 
Asset Allocation of Commodity-Based Sovereign Wealth Funds,” International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper. 
 
Burea van Dijk, 2010, publicly listed companies worldwide. Retrieved from OSIRIS Database, 
Nov. 2010. 
 
Caner, M., & Grennes, T., 2008, "Performance and Transparency of the Norwegian Sovereign 
Wealth Fund," North Carolina State University - Department of Economics, Working Paper 
Series . 
 
Chhaochharia, V., & Laeven, L., 2009, "The Investment Allocation of Sovereign Wealth Fund," 
Retrieved from Social Science Research Network: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262383 
 
Coval, J. D., T. J. Moskowitz, 1999, "Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic 
Portfolios", Journal of Finance, 6, 2045-2073. 
 
El-Erian, M. A.., 2010,  "Sovereign Wealth Funds in the New Normal," Finance & Development, 
pp. 44-47. 
 
Gjedrem, S., 2009, "Introductory statement by Mr. Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank 
(Central Bank of Norway)," at the hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and  
Economic Affairs of the Stroting (Norwegian Parliament). Oslo. 
 
IMF, 2008, "Sovereign Wealth Funds - A Work Agenda", International Monetary Fund. 
 
IWG, 2008, "Generally Accepted Principles and Practices - Santiago Principles", International 
Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds. 
 
Morgan Stanley Research Global, 2007, “How Big Could Sovereign Wealth Funds Be by 
2015?”, May 3, 2007 
 
Maslakovic, M., 2008, "Sovereign Wealth Funds 2008", International Financial Services 
London (IFSL). 
 
78
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 15, Issue 2, Winter 2011 
 
Mehrpouya, A., Huang, C., & Barnett, T., 2009, "An Analysis of Proxy Voting and Engagement 
Policies and Practices of the Sovereign Wealth Funds," New York: IRRC Institute. 
 
NBIM., 2009, "Government Pension Fund - Global, Annual Report 2008," Norges Bank 
Investment Management. 
 
Norgess Bank Investment Management, 2010, http://www.nbim.no/en/About-us/Government-
Pension-Fund-Global/ 
 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2010, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/press-center/press-
releases/2009/norwegian-ministry-of-finance-to-sell-eu.html?id=562657 
 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2009, "On the Management of the Government Pension Fund in 
2008," Report No. 20 (2008-2009) to the Storting, 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/search.html?querystring=Report+No.+20+(2008-2009). 
 
Rozanov, A., 2009, "Sovereign Wealth Funds: Definig Liabilities," Reveu d'Economie 
Financière, Special Issue . 
 
SWF., 2011, http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ 
 
SWF., 2010, http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/norway-government-pension-fund-global/ 
 
SWF., 2009, "Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute Inc.," http://www.swfinstitute.org/  
 
Temasek Holdings, 2010, “Investment Themes,” http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/our 
_portfolio.htm  
 
Temasek Holdings, 2009, "Shaping Your Journey," - Temasek Review 2009, 
http://review.temasek.com.sg/home  
 
Truman, E. M., 2008, "The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Impacts on US Foreign Policy and 
Economic Interests. Peterson Institute for International Economics,"  Testimony before the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, Washington, May 21. 
 
Truman, E. M., 2007, "Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need for Greater Transparency and 
Accountability," Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
 
Xiang, J., Wang, S., Kong, Z., & Li, W., 2009, "Investment Analysis of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
in the World," International Journal of Economics and Finance , 1 (2). 
 
Ziemba, R., 2008, "Cutting through the hype on sovereign wealth funds: a one-hit wonder or 
here for near term?" RGE monitor. 
 
79
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 15, Issue 2, Winter 2011 
 
Table 1: Principles of the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index 
 
Point Principles of the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index 
1 Fund provides history including reason for creation, origins of wealth, and government 
ownership structure 
1 Fund provides up-to-date independently audited annual reports 
1 Fund provides ownership percentage of company holdings, and geographic locations of 
holdings 
1 Fund provides total portfolio market value, returns and management compensation 
1 Fund provides guidelines in reference to ethical standards, investments policies and 
enforcer of guidelines 
1 Fund provides clear strategies and objectives 
1 If applicable, the fund clearly identifies subsidiaries and contact information 
1 If applicable, the find identifies external managers 
1 Fund manages its own web site 
1 Fund provides main office location address and contact information such as telephone 
and fax number 
 
Source: SWF Institute, 2010 
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Table 2: Total Assets of Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Percentage of Their Assets 
Retrieved From OSIRIS. 
 
Fund Country Assets (Billion)
1 
Percentage of 
Total
2 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority Abu Dhabi  (UAE) $627.0 0.54% 
Alberta Heritage Fund Canada $14.4 2.10% 
Australian Future Fund Australia $67.2 8.63% 
Brunei Investment Agency Brunei $30.0 2.33% 
China Investment Corporation China $332.4 10.20% 
Government of Singapore Singapore $247.5 0.97% 
Government Pension Fund - Global Norway $512.0 44.94% 
Investment Corporation of Dubai Dubai (UAE) $19.6 5.61% 
Kuwait Investment Authority Kuwait $202.8 3.55% 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund New Zealand $12.1 19.83% 
Public Investment Fund Saudi Arabia $5.3 22.64% 
Qatar Investment Authority Qatar $85.0 13.53% 
Rak Investment Authority UAE $1.2 10.83% 
Sovereign Fund of Brazil Brazil $8.6 11.63% 
Strategic Investment Fund France $28.0 82.86% 
Temasek Holdings Singapore $133.0 51.22% 
1- Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (January 2011). 
2- Based on 2009 data. 
 
Table 3: Herfindahl Concentration Index for Industry Distribution of the SWFs 
 
Fund Concentration Index Largest Share in 2009 
2005 2007 2009  
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 100% 87.4% 20.2% IT Consulting & Services, 27% 
Alberta Heritage Fund NA NA 100% Agriculture 
Australian Future Fund NA NA 29.2% Integrated Telecom Services,51% 
China Investment Corporation NA NA 99.7% Diversified Banks, 99.8% 
Government of Singapore 100% 22.6% 15.6% Diversified REITs, 23% 
Government Pension Fund - Global NA 4.2% 2.6% Diversified Banks, 9% 
Investment Corporation of Dubai NA NA 99.9% Specialized Finance, 99.9% 
Kuwait Investment Authority 90.7% 32.5% 24.6% Automobile Manufacturers, 75% 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund NA NA 7.2% Airport Services, 17% 
Public Investment Fund NA 21.2% 5.0% Diversified Banks, 34% 
Qatar Investment Authority NA 47.8% 34.2% Automobile Manufacturers,52% 
Rak Investment Authority NA NA 100% Diversified Metal &Mining 
Sovereign Fund of Brazil NA NA 19.8% Steel, 33% 
Strategic Investment Fund NA 6.9% 8.4% Diversified Banks, 21% 
Temasek Holdings 100% 22.6% 16.9% Integrated Telecom Services, 30% 
All Funds 5.4% Diversified Banks, 19% 
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Table 4: Hertfindahl Concentration Index for Geographic Distribution of SWFs 
 
 Fund  Concentration Index Largest Share in 2009 
2005 2007 2009  
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority NA NA 22.7% India, 29% 
Alberta Heritage Fund NA NA 100% Canada 
Australian Future Fund   99.3% Australia,99% 
China Investment Corporation   86.7% China,92% 
Government of Singapore 100% 72.1% 20.7% India,34% 
Government Pension Fund - Global NA 24.5% 13.9% Argentina,2% 
Investment Corporation of Dubai NA NA 99.9% USA, 99% 
Kuwait Investment Authority 100% 44.0% 50.7% U.K., 57% 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund NA NA 27.2% New Zealand,43% 
Public Investment Fund NA 100% 51.8% Malaysia,64% 
Qatar Investment Authority NA 67.7% 42.9% Germany,51% 
Rak Investment Authority   100% Australia 
Sovereign Fund of Brazil   100% Brazil 
Strategic Investment Fund NA 83.1% 59.2% France, 76% 
Temasek Holdings 100% 72.1% 47.6% Singapore, 65% 
All Funds 8.5% United Kingdom, 15% 
 
 
 
Table 5: Herfindahl Concentration Index for Industry Distribution of SWFs within the G8  
 
Fund Concentration Index Largest Share in 2009 
2005 2007 2009  
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 100% 87.4% 30.9% Other Financial Services, 45.0% 
Alberta Heritage Fund NA NA 100% Agricultural Products 
Government of Singapore 100% 22.6% 18.6% Diversified Banks, 38.3% 
Government Pension Fund - Global NA 4.3% 2.7% Integrated Oil & Gas, 9.1% 
Investment Corporation of Dubai NA NA 100% Specialized Finance 
Kuwait Investment Authority 90.8% 32.5% 24.6% Automobile manufacturer, 37.9% 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund NA NA 8.1% Retail REITs, 16.2% 
Public Investment Fund NA 21.2% 5.0% Integrated Oil & Gas, 14.8% 
Qatar Investment Authority NA 47.8% 34.2% Automobile manufacturer, 45.4% 
Strategic Investment Fund NA 7.0% 8.45% Multi- Utilities, 18.7% 
Temasek Holdings 100% 22.6% 18.6% Diversified Banks, 38.3% 
All funds 33.2% 4.2% 4.1% Diversified Banks, 12.7% 
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Table 6: Herfindahl Concentration Index for Geographic Distribution of SWFs within the 
G8  
 
Fund Concentration Index Largest Share in 2009 
2005 2007 2009  
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 100% 87.4% 31.1% France, 23.8% 
Alberta Heritage Fund NA NA 100% Canada 
Government of Singapore 100% 72.1% 87.1% U.K., 93.2% 
Government Pension Fund - Global NA 24.5% 24.2% U.S., 41.6% 
Investment Corporation of Dubai NA NA 100% U.S. 
Kuwait Investment Authority 100% 44.3% 50.8% U.K., 57.3% 
New Zealand Superannuation Fund NA NA 50.9% U.S., 68.0% 
Public Investment Fund NA 100% 55.5% U.K., 66.5% 
Qatar Investment Authority NA 67.7% 48.6% U.K., 52.8% 
Strategic Investment Fund NA 83.2% 82.6% France, 90.7% 
Temasek Holdings 100% 72.1% 87.1% U.K., 93.2% 
All funds 93.4% 21.39% 21.67% U.K., 29.8% 
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Table 7: The Breakdown of Temasek’s Investments by Geographic Area, Sector and 
Asset Type as of March 31, 2010 ($186b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Source: 
http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/our_portfolio_portfolio_highlights_geography.htm 
2. Source: http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/our_portfolio_portfolio_highlights_sector.htm 
3. Source: http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/our_portfolio_portfolio_highlights_liquidity.htm 
 
Distribution 2009 2010 
Panel A: 
Geographic
1 
Asia 43 46 
Singapore 31 32 
OECD 22 20 
Others 4 2 
Panel B: 
Sectors
2 
Financial Services 33 37 
Telecommunications 
Media and Technology 
27 24 
Transportation and 
Industrials 
19 18 
Life Sciences, 
Consumer Products and 
Real Estate 
10 11 
Energy and Resources 5 6 
Others 6 4 
Panel C: 
Asset Type
3 
 
Liquid & Sub 20% 
Listed assets 
34 34 
Listed Large Blocks 
(>20% share) 
38 43 
Unlisted Assets 28 23 
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Table 8: Benchmark and Diversification Goals of Norway’s Government Pension Fund-
Global  
 
Strategic Benchmark for the Government Pension Fund-Global1 
Equities; 60%  Fixed Income; 35%  Real Estate; 5% 
America 
and 
Africa; 
35% 
Europe; 
50% 
Asia and 
Oceania; 
15% 
America; 
35% 
Europe; 
60% 
Asia and 
Oceania 
5% 
 
Portfolio Diversification by Sector of Government Pension Fund- Global 2 
Financial Industrials Consumer 
Goods 
Oil 
& 
Gas 
Consumer 
Services 
Technology Basic 
Materials 
Health 
Care 
Telecoms Utilities 
23.1% 12.6% 11.7% 9.8% 8.6% 8.3% 7.7% 7.6% 5.3% 5.2% 
 
 
1. Source: Norwegian Ministry of Finance, May 2010 
2. December 2007 
 
85
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 15, Issue 2, Winter 2011 
 
Figure 1: The Ten largest Sovereign Wealth Funds, January 2011 
 
 
Source: SWF Institute, 2011 
 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of SWFs that Invest in Specific Asset Classes. 
 
Source: IMF 2008 
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Appendix 1: 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings by Assets Under Management 
 
Country Fund Name 
Assets 
$Billion 
Inception Origin 
Linaburg-Maduel 
Transparency Index 
UAE – Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority $627 1976 Oil 3 
Norway 
Government Pension Fund – 
Global 
$512 1990 Oil 10 
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings $439.1 n/a Oil 2 
China SAFE Investment Company $347.1** 1997 Non-Commodity 2 
China China Investment Corporation $332.4 2007 Non-Commodity 6 
China – Hong Kong 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Investment Portfolio 
$259.3 1993 Non-Commodity 8 
Singapore 
Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation 
$247.5 1981 Non-Commodity 6 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority $202.8 1953 Oil 6 
China National Social Security Fund $146.5 2000 Non-Commodity 5 
Russia National Welfare Fund $142.5* 2008 Oil 5 
Singapore Temasek Holdings $133 1974 Non-Commodity 10 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority $85 2005 Oil 5 
Libya Libyan Investment Authority $70 2006 Oil 2 
Australia Australian Future Fund $67.2 2004 Non-Commodity 10 
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund $56.7 2000 Oil 1 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund $38 2000 Oil 6 
South Korea Korea Investment Corporation $37 2005 Non-Commodity 9 
US – Alaska Alaska Permanent Fund $37 1976 Oil 10 
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional $36.8 1993 Non-Commodity 4 
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund $33 2001 Non-Commodity 10 
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency $30 1983 Oil 1 
France Strategic Investment Fund $28 2008 Non-Commodity n/a 
Iran Oil Stabilization Fund $23 1999 Oil 1 
Chile 
Social and Economic Stabilization 
Fund 
$21.8 1985 Copper 10 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund $21.7 1999 Oil 10 
UAE – Abu Dubai Investment Corporation of Dubai $19.6 2006 Oil 4 
Canada Alberta’s Heritage Fund $14.4 1976 Oil 9 
UAE – Abu Dhabi 
International Petroleum 
Investment Company 
$14 1984 Oil n/a 
87
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 15, Issue 2, Winter 2011 
 
US – New Mexico 
New Mexico State Investment 
Council 
$13.8 1958 Non-Commodity 9 
UAE – Abu Dhabi Mubadala Development Company $13.3 2002 Oil 10 
New Zealand 
New Zealand Superannuation 
Fund 
$12.1 2003 Non-Commodity 10 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company $9.1 2006 Oil 8 
Brazil Sovereign Fund of Brazil $8.6 2009 Non-Commodity new 
Oman State General Reserve Fund $8.2 1980 Oil & Gas 1 
Botswana Pula Fund $6.9 1994 
Diamonds & 
Minerals 
6 
East Timor Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund $6.3 2005 Oil & Gas 6 
Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund $5.3 2008 Oil 3 
China China-Africa Development Fund $5.0 2007 Non-Commodity 4 
US – Wyoming 
Permanent Wyoming Mineral 
Trust Fund 
$4.7 1974 Minerals 9 
Trinidad & Tobago Heritage and Stabilization Fund $2.9 2000 Oil 8 
UAE – Ras Al 
Khaimah 
RAK Investment Authority $1.2 2005 Oil 3 
Venezuela FEM $0.8 1998 Oil 1 
Vietnam 
State Capital Investment 
Corporation 
$0.5 2006 Non-Commodity 4 
Nigeria Excess Crude Account $0.5 2004 Oil 1 
Kiribati 
Revenue Equalization Reserve 
Fund 
$0.4 1956 Phosphates 1 
Indonesia Government Investment Unit $0.3 2006 Non-Commodity n/a 
Mauritania 
National Fund for Hydrocarbon 
Reserves 
$0.3 2006 Oil & Gas 1 
UAE – Federal Emirates Investment Authority n/a 2007 Oil 2 
Oman Oman Investment Fund n/a 2006 Oil n/a 
UAE – Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Council n/a 2007 Oil n/a 
 Total Oil & Gas Related $2,380.7 
 Total Other $1,741.9 
 TOTAL $4,122.6 
 
Source: SWF Institute, January 21, 2011 
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Appendix 2: Recent Sovereign Wealth Fund Market Size by Quarter** 
Source: SWF Institute, January 21, 2011 
**The above data has been extracted on specific dates. Market size reflects official disclosure, fund 
creation, investment activity, capital injections, and other variables. 
November 
2010
December 2009 
Sep2007 
 
Dec2007 
 
Mar2008 Jun2008 Sep2008 Dec2008 Mar2009 
3,190 3,130 
3,300 3,789 
3,927 3,976 3,587 
 
Jun2009 Sep2009 Dec2009 Mar2010 Jun2010 Sep2010 Dec2010 
 
3,628 3,752 3,809 3,839 3,891 3,938 4,111 
 
89
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance Volume 15, Issue 2, Winter 2011 
 
Appendix 3: 
Countries from Which the Ownership Report of Sovereign Wealth Funds Are Obtained 
 
 
   
Argentina Hong Kong Philippines 
Australia Hungary Poland 
Austria India Portugal 
Belgium Indonesia Russian Federation 
Brazil Ireland Singapore 
Canada Israel South Africa 
Chile Italy Spain 
China Japan Sweden 
Colombia Republic of Korea Switzerland 
Czech Republic Luxembourg Taiwan 
Denmark Malaysia Thailand 
Egypt Mexico Turkey 
Finland Netherlands United kingdom 
France New Zealand United States 
Germany Norway  
Greece Peru  
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